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Ethnicity, structure and globalization: an argument about Association
football in Australia, 1958–2010
Roy Hay*
Deakin University; Sports and Editorial Services Australia, Victoria, Australia
The overwhelming weight of academic historical writing on Association football in
Australia since the 1970s has focused on the game through the prism of ethnicity. The
ills of the game and its failure to become the dominant code of football, as it is in many
countries, are regularly attributed to the many ways in which the game was or could be
portrayed as a foreign import that brought non-Australian concerns onto the sporting
field where they had no place. Here it is argued that structural issues have a much
greater role to play in understanding the evolution of the game since the 1950s. Global
changes in sport and Association football in particular have also impinged significantly
on the game in Australia. Now football is a major part of the Australian sporting
landscape, though its position vis-a`-vis rival codes remains contested.
Introduction
The Canadian historian Archibald Paton Thornton argued that ‘“imperialism” is not
a word for scholars’.1 ‘Ethnicity’ carries at least as much baggage and its use in popular
and political discourse has rendered it virtually useless without a thorough definitional
prologue, which would occupy most of the space allocated to this article. When the
Australian Research Council awarded Dr Bill Murray and me a competitive research grant
to investigate ‘The role of soccer in modern Australian society: Immigration, ethnicity
and nationalism’ in 2000, we thought we knew what we were doing. However, one of our
referees worried that ‘we might underestimate the contribution of British, particularly
Scottish, migrants to the development of the sport in Australia’. Given that Murray and
I were both born and raised in Scotland, we initially laughed at this suggestion but then
reflected that the Scots in Australia have never considered themselves ethnics. And therein
lies the problem. Who defines ethnicity and for whom?2
Ethnicity is an issue of ascription, not of science, and nowhere is this more true
than in relation to migrants and sport in Australia. ‘Real’ Aussies play, watch and talk
about cricket and Australian (Rules) football or rugby league: ‘wogs’ play soccer. Such a
statement would probably have been uncontroversial a decade or so ago, though it is
manifestly untrue in 2010. Why has that occurred? Is it a matter of perception, or changes
in ascription, or more fundamental changes in society? Leaders of the code have made
enormous and consistent efforts to ‘mainstream’ the sport and reduce as far as possible all
manifestations of ethnicity. Has this significantly altered its image in Australian society?3
Has ethnic soccer been successfully rebranded as new football? In particular, has the new
A-League solved the problems that plagued the previous National Soccer League (NSL)?
ISSN 1743-0437 print/ISSN 1743-0445 online
q 2011 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2011.587299
http://www.tandfonline.com
*Email: haysoc@bigpond.com
Sport in Society
Vol. 14, No. 6, August 2011, 833–850
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
oy
 H
ay
] a
t 0
6:4
1 2
0 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
1 
But if the problems faced by the round ball code were structural as much as they were
ethnic, is there an alternative explanation for the recent apparent success of the game in
becoming part of the Australian pantheon and a real competitor with the other varieties of
professional football – Australian (Rules) football, rugby league and rugby union? The
structural issues need to be approached on two levels. There are those associated with the
governing structure of the game as a whole, identified as critical by David Crawford in his
major report on the code in 2003.4 Then there are those relating to the operation of the
flagship league of the game, where the absence of cartel discipline (the ability and
willingness of the participants to collude to produce a competitive and marketable sporting
product) is seen by Braham Dabscheck as helping to define the differences between the
alleged failure of the NSL and the success of the A-League.5
Finally, there are the changes in Australia’s economic position in the world, associated
with what has been described in shorthand as globalization.6 This has had an impact on
the most global game of all: as football throughout the world has been commodified and
integrated, the understanding of the game in Australia at both governmental and popular
levels has in turn been changed. Australia’s economy has become more bound up with
Asia, particularly China, India and Japan, and football has a unique potential to support
and underpin the political economy of this new set of relationships. When governments of
both major political persuasions in Australia find it necessary to pour large sums of public
money into Association football to help finance its domestic operations, as well as bids
to secure the largest global sporting event of the modern world, the FIFA (Fe´de´ration
International de Football Association) World Cup, then it appears that a fundamental
change in the position of the game has occurred.7
My conclusion, to anticipate what follows, is to challenge the dominance of the ethnic
paradigm but not by weighing these three elements – ethnicity, structure and globalization –
in a crude quantitative way, but by showing how they are interrelated and arguing that all
three perspectives need to be considered if we are to understand the changed role and
position of Association football in Australia over the last 60 years.
Ethnicity
By the 1950s, Association football in Australia had been tagged as the ethnic game, one
predominantly played by and supported by recent migrants from a wider range of ancestral
backgrounds than ever before.8 Previously, the game might have been regarded as a
British import; now it could be portrayed as decisively foreign because migrants
from Europe had apparently taken over.9 The Scots and English migrants who set up the
clubs and organizations that underpinned the local game from the late nineteenth century
onwards had often favoured a structure in which the overseas community from which they
came, rather than a local district in Australia, was the focal point. This was in contrast
to other football codes and other sports that used local geography as the basis for club
identities. Divisions in Association football, sometimes resulting in major organizational
crises, often turned on this issue. Concerns about professionalism in football and the
distribution of income between clubs and governing bodies were also sources of conflict.
Post-war migrants repeated the pattern, sometimes from choice and at other times because
they had been rebuffed by existing clubs.10 Often they made strenuous efforts to be
inclusive, but were still regarded by their host society as ‘the other’.11
After World War II, migrants from continental Europe arrived in substantial numbers.
Many of these newcomers played a very different style of game from the muscular British
variety, and this sometimes led to clashes on and off the field. The crowds of several
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thousands who now attended games on unenclosed grounds, or filled Olympic Park in
Melbourne or Wentworth Park in Sydney on Sundays for the match of the day, could be
boisterous, and incidents between groups of fans occurred. The local media regularly
attributed such unseemly affairs to the import of European politics, but this was frequently
not the cause at all. As I have argued elsewhere, attacks on referees had more to do with a
passionate commitment to the game.12 The money now flowing into the game as a growing
spectator sport enabled the emergence of semi-professionalism for players, just at the time
when Australia hosted the Olympic Games in Melbourne in 1956 – the last bastion of
amateur competition in football.13
The amateur administrators of the code were challenged by the new migrant groups
whose team names reflected their origins just as clearly as did those of the previous
generations. So in the Victorian State League in the 1961 there were Box Hill (English),
Polonia (Polish), Moreland (Scottish), George Cross (Maltese), Wilhelmina (Dutch),
Hakoah (Jewish), South Melbourne Hellas (Greek), Slavia (Czechoslovakian), JUST
(Serbian), Melbourne (Hungarian), Juventus (Italian) and Richmond Allemania (German).
In Sydney, the failure to promote one of the most successful migrant clubs, Hakoah, to
the top league was the catalyst for a major challenge to the existing organization and,
subsequently, a breakaway by several major clubs.14 What began as a purely local issue
quickly assumed international implications. Some of the leading migrant clubs in Sydney,
including Prague, St George Budapest andHakoah, liked to argue that the players they were
attracting from Europe were just fellow migrants, but FIFA rules required that transfer fees
be paid for them to the European clubs from which they came. A breakaway movement by
the clubs in Sydney quickly spread to the rest of Australia and the Australian Soccer
Federation (ASF) replaced the previous amateur body. Australia’s membership of FIFA
was suspended for two years until a compromise financial arrangement was reached.15
By 1962, the ASF was established in nominal control of the game across the country
and Australia’s membership of FIFA was reactivated in mid-1963. League competitions
organized by the state federations were drawing healthy crowds of several thousands, even
in Victoria where market competition from the VFL was greatest.16 Clubs representing
many ‘new’ migrant communities now dominated these leagues, though the players taking
part at the elite level were often more varied in their background than the communities that
supported and financed the clubs. Australians of long standing, including a few Aboriginal
players, were making their way in the game – notably Charles Perkins, John Moriarty and
later Harry Williams. The growth in spectator numbers, teams and players placed great
strain on facilities and officials; indeed, many of the troubles of this and the next decade
can be attributed to the sheer growth of the game and the structure established in the early
1960s, rather than its ethnic composition – on which most critical attention has centred.17
In the last season of the Victorian Amateur Soccer Football Association in 1961, there
were 62 clubs taking part, with roughly double that number of teams fielded in senior
football. By 1982, there were 155 clubs and 310 teams. Junior numbers went up faster still,
particularly in New South Wales.18
The groups in charge of the game were a mixture of new migrant nationalities and
those who had been in Australia for some time. Each state retained its practical autonomy,
ran its flagship league competition, and only came into sustained contact with the national
body when touring teams visited and/or selection for Australian teams was required.
Within each state, the leading clubs in the top league had disproportionate voting rights,
usually a majority of those involved. A very restricted franchise resulted so that horse-
trading and personal politics were almost inevitable. In Victoria, as late as 2000, the 14
Premier League clubs and the four Victorian NSL clubs combined had 50% of the votes at
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general meetings. The 56 State League clubs had the other half of the votes. Provisional
League clubs, referees, juniors and amateurs had no voting rights. In turn, the state bodies
were the major stakeholders in the ASF. New South Wales (along with Northern New
South Wales, which had separate representation as a result of its historical role in the
development of the game and some highly efficient lobbying) and Victoria, the most
populous states and the ones with the largest numbers of players, had one third of the votes
in the Federation between them.
One of the strengths of the new groups in charge of football in Australia was their
international outlook. Drawn from a wide range of European societies, including the UK,
they were more aware of developments in the game overseas and many had personal
experience of involvement. They brought ideas and approaches that were new and fresh in
the Australian context, but this could also be a weakness since the traditions of Association
football were often quite different from those that had grown up in the football codes and
other sports in Australia. The concept of promotion and relegation, for example, was a key
feature of football throughout the world. Clubs could aspire to the highest level through their
performances on the field; they were not allocated to competitions among a self-selected
group, as with Australian (Rules) football and cricket. In Australia, the idea of promotion and
relegation has been regarded as a weakness, since it meant that new teams would appear each
season and familiar ones would drop out. It gave the appearance of instability and created
significant marketing problems for the administrators of the national competition.19
Structure
The fundamental problem for the new leaders of the game, however, was the organizational
structure they set up in 1958–62. This left control of the game in the hands of the clubs and
their state federations, just at a timewhen the emphasis of the game, and its major costs, were
shifting to the national and international level. The tail was wagging the dog.20 A tiny
restricted franchise encouraged horse-trading and local politics and it was this, rather
than tensions over ethnicity, that shouldered much of the blame for weak governance and
hamstrung the next generation of visionaries who wanted to take the game forward.
Until the appearance of John Kallinikios’s book nearly everyone who has written on the
game in Australia had blamed ethnicity for its problems.21 He argued that the sheer growth
of the game in the previous and succeeding years was at the heart of the organizational
issues. The structure that was established would have been quite appropriate for a club-
based and state-based organization of the sport, but was not only unsuitable for a national
and international game, but was the major cause of the self-generated issues affecting the
code. Opposition from the other football codes, as well as criticism of ‘ethnic soccer’ by the
mainstream media and the general population are important but not key matters here.
Comparison with other codes domestically and internationally demonstrates the validity of
this argument.
There is a clear contrast with Australian Rules football and the Australian Football
League (AFL), which got its governing structures right by the 1990s after a very protracted
struggle, though the process started with Sir Kenneth Luke in the 1950s.22 Luke
was president of the Victorian Football League (VFL) and of the Carlton Football Club.
When the Victorian state government baulked at the cost of upgrading Carlton’s home
ground, Princes Park stadium, for the Olympic Games in Melbourne in 1956 and settled
for improving the Melbourne Cricket Ground (MCG) instead, Luke faced two problems.
The first was that the clubs forming the VFL were its effective masters and the league’s
central administration was their servant. The second was the control of the ground
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managers of the various suburban stadia and the MCG where the VFL played its matches.
What Luke saw as an unreasonable share of the income generated by the code was
siphoned off by the managers of the venues.23
In a visionary move, he persuaded his colleagues to purchase some land, then used as
market gardens, to the south-east of Melbourne. On it he proposed to erect a stadium to
hold 157,000 spectators, which would have made it the second biggest sports arena in the
world, behind only the Maracana in Brazil. That ground would give the VFL the capacity
to hold its largest drawing games there and thus free the league from the ground managers.
But also the income from the stadium would flow to the league initially and thus it would
help decouple the league from the clubs over time. Then the central administration could
effectively set directions for the league and the game and impose effective cartel discipline
on the competition.
Luke’s bold vision was never completed on the planned scale, but nevertheless the
much-maligned Waverley Park succeeded in its primary objectives and as late as 1991,
25% of all patrons who attended VFL home-and-away matches were passing through the
turnstiles of Waverley. The financial basis for the transformation of the VFL into the AFL
was laid by the construction of Waverley Park and the establishment of a commission to
run the game and take a broader view of its development untrammelled by club control.
But it did not happen overnight.
Graham Samuel, former commissioner of the AFL, says: ‘the benefit of an independent
commission can only flow when clubs and other vested interests are willing to relinquish
control and invest full faith in the game’s tribal council’.24 Samuelwas anAFL commissioner
from its foundation in 1985 until 2002, and in 2009 he was chairman of the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission. He recalls that originally the commission’s
recommendations had to be ratified by a board consisting of the 12 club presidents and ‘the
result was that the body established to provide strong corporate governance was regularly
rolled by cash-strapped and self-interested clubs’. So the VFL/AFL, after a period, solved its
structural problems at the governance level, but the round ball code failed to do so. That,
however, is not the only sense in which structure is important.
Braham Dabscheck, in one of the most incisive critiques of Association football in
Australia in the second half of the twentieth century, insists that ‘structure is everything’.25
His emphasis, much like that of Samuel, is on cartel discipline as the key to commercial
success. A sporting league needs equality of competition, or something approaching that, if it
is to produce a sustained and attractive product for fans, investors and sponsors, and the
media. Dabscheck argues that formuch of the period from the 1950s to the end of the century,
football lacked that cartel discipline and the code was riven by ethnic disputes and personal
politics. In his account, the Australian Professional Footballers’ Association (APFA) was the
driving force in placing cartel discipline on the agenda in the 1990s and its model was
eventually adopted by the Kemeny Report in 2003.26 That report re-established the primacy
of a geographical market-based approach to club location, effectively one-city, one-team, as
it evolved into an eight-team competition – the A-League – that commenced in 2005. In the
process, cultural and community values – both ethnic identity and locality – have been
subordinated to those of business and commerce, with, as Stephen Wagg has put it, the
players becoming ‘the standard bearers for consumer capitalism’.27
Football goes national and international
During the 1960s and 1970s, Association football broke new ground in Australia.28 Tours
by overseas clubs and national bodies resumed. Australia began the tortuous process of
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trying to qualify for the World Cup, and this immediately demonstrated one of the most
fundamental weaknesses of the structure so laboriously established for the code. Although
the ASF was recognized by FIFA as the controlling body, power still lay with the state
stakeholders, whose divergent interests and local politics were to disrupt attempts to cope
with a change in the primary focus of the game from the state competitions to the
expensive national team and later the national league.29 In February 1963, the death of
Henry Seamonds, who had presided over the establishment of the new federation, removed
a moderating influence on the organization.30
By the 1960s, reductions in the real cost of air travel had made the organization of a
national competition much more economic, provided that sponsorship could be obtained.
Airlines advertised regularly in football newspapers in the 1950s and 1960s. Sponsorship
from companies seeking to establish or extend a national presence was essential to help
cover the costs involved, and the Ampol petroleum company took up the running, with one
of its executives, William, later Sir William, Walkley becoming the leading figure in the
game.31 Colour television was now available and hence national exposure for commercial
operations was feasible. Television also brought international football to Australian homes
for the first time, revealing or confirming the gap between standards in the local game and
that played overseas. The wider availability of radio licences and stations allowed the
football leagues and organizations to gain airtime for results and news programmes. It was
not just the broadcast media that wakened up to the potential of football. Specialist papers
like Soccer World appeared, catering for a demand for coverage of the game in New South
Wales, while daily papers like the Sun and the Age in Victoria carried more regular and
extensive reports on the local game. Laurie Schwab was able to persuade the Age to launch
a new specialist paper, Soccer Action, in Victoria in 1976.
In 1977, three years after Australia’s first World Cup experience, Association football
was the first code in the country to set up a national league. Attendances were actually
falling at the time and the proponents of the national league were not surfing a wave of
post-World Cup euphoria, as is often argued.32 Not all the states were included. The
Western Australians wished to be, but the eastern states demurred, though one of the plans
for the league included a play-off against the western champion. There was strong
Victorian opposition to the national league initially, but this was breached by the dynamic
Tom Bailey of the ambitious Mooroolbark club. His decision to apply for membership
forced South Melbourne Hellas, Fitzroy United Alexander and Footscray JUST to follow
suit. The league was initially sponsored by the Phillips electrical and communications
company, which had naming rights. Fourteen teams took part, comprising St George,
Eastern Suburbs, Western Suburbs, Marconi and Olympic, from Sydney; Adelaide City
and West Adelaide; Brisbane City and Brisbane Lions; and Canberra City, plus the four
Victorians.33
Having reached the World Cup finals for the first time in 1974 and having set up the
first national league of any football code in Australia in 1977, the leaders of the game were
confident that the immediate future would see further success. Unfortunately, they and the
thousands of fans who were turning out to games, and the broader community that had an
interest in the sport, were to be seriously disappointed.
For most of the next two decades the code made little headway at senior level, though
in age-restricted competitions, while not taken very seriously by the major countries of
Europe and South America, young Australians began to make a mark. The Joeys, the
Under-17 national team, reached the final of their World Cup in New Zealand in 1999,
losing on penalties to the mighty Brazil. The Young Socceroos, the Under-20s, got through
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to the semi-final of their World Cup against the host Portugal in 1991, and the Under-23
Olyroos reached a similar stage at the Barcelona Olympics the following year.
The best men’s performance came in the Confederation Cup in 1997, where Australia
reached the final against Brazil, and there were some good victories over international
touring teams. But Australia failed to repeat its 1974 qualification for the World Cup until
2006; in the meantime, the domestic game was denuded of some of its best players, who
sought careers overseas in continental Europe and the UK.34 The women’s game also
stuttered after establishing its national championship and taking part in its first international
games.
Internal problems within the code, including the structure so laboriously established
in the early 1960s and its administrative consequences, compounded the lack of cartel
discipline in the national league. There were differences associated with ethnicity,
particularly between communities drawn from the Balkans, and some of those spilled over
into damaging episodes of violence, There were fewer of these incidents than a voracious
media suggested, but they did considerable damage to the image of the game. Externally,
as we have seen, the AFL set up a small independent commission to run its game, began an
aggressive expansion into New South Wales, South Australia, Western Australia and
Queensland. In the last three states, Australian (Rules) football competitions were already
strong, so the AFL demarche was more in the form of a takeover, and was strongly resisted
initially.35 The AFL counter-attacked football whenever it could, directly and through the
media.36 Rugby league defended its patch in New South Wales and Queensland and
remained the top code in those states.
Overseas, the game of football was wracked by violence, culminating in the Heysel
disaster in 1985, which resulted in the banishment of English clubs from the flagship
European competitions, and the catastrophic events at Hillsborough and Bradford, where
fans were crushed or burned to death. So football in England, still the reference point for the
game in Australia, suffered a sharp decline in attendances and the very real threat of
sanctions and public controls, until an inquiry led by Mr Justice Taylor proposed a radical
transformation of the conditions under which people watched the game. Covered, all-seated
modern stadia replaced the decaying relics of the early twentieth-century game, where the
majority of fans stood on sloping, mud-covered terraces. The wire cages that had been
erected to keep hooligans apart came down and the cost of attendance increased in a thinly
disguised attempt to price the lower orders out of the game. Plans for identification cards and
compulsory club membership were only narrowly avoided in England, but patrons could be
closely monitored through seat allocations and closed-circuit television.37
Frank Lowy and the ‘new football’ revolution
By the end of the 1990s, the game itself was changing at international level, becoming
more explicitly commodified and a competitive part of the entertainment industry.
Changes to players’ contracts following a series of legal decisions, particularly that won
by Jean-Marc Bosman, resulted in massive increases in the wages of top-level stars. What
was dubbed ‘the prune juice effect’ saw much higher proportions of club incomes spent on
wages, sometimes more than the annual income of the club concerned, which is an
unsustainable position. Only the arrival of a new breed of plutocrats investing in the top
clubs enabled them to survive.38 Football in Australia was deeply affected by these trends,
but there was an internal dynamic as well, and this began to work in Australia’s favour.
What proved to be the last of throw of the ASF occurred at the end the 1990s. It came very
close to success.
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Football, like all sport, turns on incidents that happen in a moment. Though there may
be deeper and longer running causes, what happens on the field crystallizes success or
failure in an instant. The former head of the ABC and a passionate football follower, David
Hill had become head of the ASF in 1996. He determined to weed out the old ethnic groups
and mainstream the game, believing that this would attract much greater popular and
media support. Hill organized a ‘soccer summit’ at which various interests in the code
including some selected fans were able to present their views on the ills of the game and
ways of moving forward.39 But Hill had already made up his mind about the changes he
thought needed to be made. Reflecting on his three years at the helm of the code he said,
‘What we should have done is wiped the slate clean and started again, which is exactly
what they are doing now, but I couldn’t. I could never get the numbers to do that. So I tried
to change the old national league and inject the Perth Glorys. But it didn’t work because
the core was too rotten as a product. It was too ethnocentric.’40 With the aid of his
president, former New South Wales premier, Neville Wran, Hill tried to force through the
changes he believed necessary, but he could not carry his board colleagues with him
consistently, as club interests outweighed those of the game as a whole.
His ‘crash through or crash’ gamble turned on a moment deep in the second half of
Australia’s World Cup qualifier against Iran at the MCG on 29 November 1997. Leading
by two goals to nil and threatening to add to their lead at any time, the Socceroos’
momentum was spectacularly disrupted by the intervention of a serial intruder.41
Subsequently, Iran scored twice late in the match to draw the game and hence, under FIFA
rules, triumph because it had scored more goals away from home. The result reduced
Australian football icon Johnny Warren to tears and the ASF to the brink of bankruptcy.
Hill had mortgaged the future of the code to success in World Cup qualification and
had sold the television rights to the national league and the Socceroos to Channel 7 for 10
years. In England, gaining the rights to broadcasting the Premier League had enabled pay-
TV channel BSkyB to increase its penetration of the market dramatically, but Australia’s
national league was operating in a very different environment. So when Channel 7 decided
to withdraw the round-ball code from its free-to-air service, but instead relegate it to its
pay-TV arm, C7, the public image of the game disappeared.42 Hill also decided to retain
Terry Venables as national coach at his inflated salary to the end of his contract, even
though qualification for the next World Cup was four years away, so the costs of running
the national teams and the national league could not be sustained from football’s income.
By 1998, the failure of Hill’s strategy was clear, and he and Venables departed, leaving
football to the old gang that Hill had been unable to eradicate, though he had truncated
their influence while in office. Hill’s successor was Basil Scarsella, the South Australian
who had played ‘good cop’ and conciliator as Hill tried to force through his mainstreaming
changes. The worst of the old politics reasserted itself as Tony Labbozzetta of Marconi and
his allies warred with a faction led by Victorian Joe Brondolino and the more progressive
elements in the game, including Nick Tana from Perth. Lacking the resources to finance
another high-profile overseas appointment, the hierarchy made a virtue of necessity and
appointed the first Australian-born coach of the Socceroos in Frank Farina. Farina had
enjoyed a strong overseas career, primarily in France and Belgium, but also with a stint in
Serie A in Italy with Bari. On returning to Australia towards the end of his playing career,
he had taken Brisbane Strikers to the national league title in 1997 as player–coach.
In 2001, Farina’s Socceroos reached a play-off against the fifth South American team,
Uruguay, twice winner of the World Cup in its early days. Though the home leg was won
by a Kevin Muscat penalty, the away game in Montevideo ended in a 3–0 defeat. Yet
another failure to qualify for the World Cup had resulted and it began to appear that the
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feat of 1974 would be unrepeatable. To some domestic surprise, Farina kept his position,
but there was no strong local candidate and the job was not attractive to a first-class
overseas coach.
Until 2005 the Socceroos’ qualification route to theWorld Cup had involved a series of
matches against the minnow nations of Oceania and New Zealand, which Australia had
successfully negotiated on each occasion apart from 1982. Thereafter, however, the final
qualification depended on a two-leg play-off against one of the powerhouses of South
America, Europe or Asia, which had proved to be an obstacle too far on each occasion.
After the 2002World Cup in Japan and South Korea, seeking to strengthen his position
for re-election as President of FIFA, Josef S. Blatter promised to support direct entry to the
World Cup in Germany in 2006 for the winner of the Oceania Confederation qualification
matches. This was naively greeted with great appreciation in Australia on the assumption
that it virtually guaranteed the Socceroos success at last. But the South Americans were
not prepared to surrender access to a play-off chance for their fifth ranked team. Strenuous
lobbying by the powerful South Americans, backed by the Europeans, gave the FIFA
president the chance to use the disarray in Australian and Oceania football ranks as the
excuse to withdraw his commitment.
Domestic woes
Meanwhile, Soccer Australia and the NSL struggled on, burning what sponsorship they
had and with no free-to-air television. Mounting press and Special Broadcasting Service
criticism undermined what little credibility the code retained.43 Despite the absence of the
elite players who were plying their trade overseas, the playing standard in the NSL was
reasonable, albeit with poor crowds, even though the game was played in summer to avoid
direct competition with the other football codes, contributed to the lack of atmosphere at
games. The exception was in Perth, where Nick Tana’s Glory won the title in 2003, having
been runner-up the previous year. Nearly 43,000 attended the 2002 final at Subiaco and
38,111 in 2003. The Glory showed how the game could be marketed with a multiethnic
appeal and a core group of English migrant or local fans who wanted to model themselves
on English Premier League supporters.44 In the east, however, the old order made
promises to promote the game, but they remained unfulfilled, until even Tana had had
enough.
Control of the game in Australia reverted to the old guard. Tony Labbozzetta replaced
Scarsella, who became president of the Oceania Confederation of FIFA in September
2001. By 2002 it was clear to nearly everyone inside and outside the game that collapse,
financial and organizational, was imminent. Opposition to the Labbozzetta regime had
grown and eventually a group led by Steve Doszpot and Ian Knop overthrew the Marconi
heavyweight in a palace coup in which Knop dissembled his support for Labbozzetta until
the last moment. Both Knop and Doszpot had strong connections with the Liberal Party at
federal level and the timing of their move was propitious. The prime minister, John
Howard, was committed to expanding Australia’s links with Asia to mesh with its growing
economic connections to the fastest growing area of the world economy. Though Howard
had little or no knowledge of Association football, he eventually began to understand,
perhaps coached by his sports minister Rod Kemp, that this code possessed the only
substantial and continuing sporting penetration across the region. Cricket, rugby union and
Australian (Rules) football did not cut it in Asia, apart from cricket in India, while football
did throughout the continent. But there was no prospect of the Australian federal
government becoming involved with the game in its current dysfunctional state.
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The Crawford Report
Knop was able to persuade Kemp and Howard to support a root-and-branch inquiry into
the code by David Crawford, whose earlier report on Australian (Rules) football had been
an important contribution to the transformation of that sport in the 1990s. With Johnny
Warren by his side, Crawford’s strategy was brilliant. While he investigated the malaise at
the heart of the administration of the game, he arranged for a country-wide submission of
grass-roots views on what should be done, and allowed many of those who responded to
appear before his representatives to present more detailed comment. When his report
appeared, it could claim a degree of legitimacy that took it out of the realm of the
traditional politics of the game. So Crawford had leverage at the centre and around the
country, and his proposals gained sufficient momentum to overcome resistances inside
the old structures.45
Though Crawford’s proposals were predicated on total organizational reform, it
required a dynamic cadre of leaders to carry them through. Frank Lowy, reputed at the
time to be Australia’s second-richest person and the driving force behind the Westfield
shopping complex group, was persuaded to return to the game he had abandoned in the
1980s.46 Lowy had learned and come to despise Australian football politics during his time
with the Hakoah club in Sydney, and had eventually pulled the club out of the NSL at the
start of the 1987 season. Though he had considered returning to the game in previous
years, he initially turned down the request to lead the reconstruction proposed by Crawford
in 2003.
Lowy returns
Lowy was able to drive a hard bargain in consideration for taking over as head of Soccer
Australia in 2003. He obtained a commitment by the federal government of $15 million to
pay off the debts of the organization and to help provide working capital for its
reconstruction. There were no strings attached to this subvention and Lowy had a free hand
to pick his board and chief executive officer. For the latter role, he settled on John O’Neill,
who had no football background but had been a banker and then presided over the
transformation of rugby union into a professional enterprise that staged the highly
successful Rugby World Cup in Australia in 2003. The board was also chosen for its
business and media skills, not its knowledge of the game. The initial board consisted of
John Singleton, the Sydney advertising and media entrepreneur; Ron Walker, then chair of
Melbourne Major Events and the Australian Formula One Grand Prix; former Ernst &
Young Australia chief executive Brian Schwartz; former Sydney Organising Committee
for the Olympic Games lawyer Suzanne Williams; and Phil Wolanski, company director
and former team manager of Northern Spirit. Apart from Wolanski, they had little direct
football knowledge or involvement but had very impressive business and political links.
There was a rearguard action by a rump of the old board of Soccer Australia until July
2003, but then the Lowy takeover was consummated. At state level, changes were under
way, too. Under Lowy, the board determined to make a clean break from the previous
structure and image of the game. Soccer Australia was wound up as expeditiously as
possible and replaced by a new entity – the Football Federation of Australia (FFA). The
name change was more than symbolic, but it did show the self-confidence of those behind
the move that the game could reclaim its international name in Australia. The game was
marketed as ‘new football not old soccer’ and ‘football, but not as you know it’. The
haemorrhaging of money through the NSL was brought to an end and the league closed
down for a year while a new competition, to be called the A-League and drawing on
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overseas experience in England, Japan and the USA, was planned. A number of young
local players thus had their careers interrupted at a critical period and the effects of this
were not fully appreciated.
The fundamental structural change of the Lowy revolution was that the FFA became
the governing body of the game rather than the creature of the state stakeholders. The
constitution redistributed voting rights to a much wider range of groups involved in the
game and made the horse-trading of the old system virtually impossible.
New structure
In the ASF, club and ethnic interests had controlled the game; the tail had wagged the dog
throughout its existence. Crawford and Lowy made certain that the new body, which
became the FFA, was the governing institution of the code. The state bodies became, as
they should have been in 1962, subordinate to the FFA, with constitutions that were
planned to be derivative of that of the FFA, though it took until 2008 before the last of
them was brought into line. The other stakeholders in the game – the grass-roots
supporters, the juniors, the referees – all had explicit if small representation in the new
structure. This was important symbolically, but also as a potential counterbalance to a
revival of state or club control, should that threaten.47
At the centre, the new board of the FFA set out to operate on a business model, setting
policy and arranging priorities, with implementation undertaken by the CEO and his staff,
many of whom were cherry-picked from sporting and business organizations. The close
involvement of Lowy, his companies and his family ensured that consistency of purpose was
maintained. However, when some financial goals were not achieved, particularly in
connection with the new A-League and its clubs, Lowy or his family’s financial intervention
raised questions about a conflict of interest.
Into Asia
Perhaps the single most important achievement of the new Football Federation was the
acceptance of Australia into the Asian Confederation at last. Lowy and his team were able
to overcome fears that Australia would be a disruptive influence in the larger body, would
treat the Asians with disrespect, and would monopolize one of the hard-won guaranteed
places in future World Cups. The self-confidence of the Japanese and South Koreans after
their successful joint hosting of the World Cup in 2002, the relative success of their
domestic national leagues and the diplomatic skills of Mohamed bin Hamman, the Qatari
President of the Asian Confederation and a FIFA Executive Committee member, helped
smooth the path for Australian entry. The departure of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad in 2003 removed a political opponent of Australian engagement in Asia.48
The Australian team brought competitiveness on the field, a large television and media
market, especially for Asian firms seeking exposure, a strong track record of hosting major
events, including the Olympic Games and two FIFA World Youth competitions, and
government support.
Australia’s performances at the FIFA World Cup finals in Germany in 2006 and the
subsequent Asian Championship in 2007 turned out to be just what the Asian
Confederation needed. In the former, Australia was the only one of the four Asian nations
taking part to qualify for the knock-out stages. Japan, South Korea and Iran won only one
game between them, South Korea’s victory over Togo. Australia then met the eventual
tournament winner, Italy, and held it scoreless until the very last minute of the game, going
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down to a penalty kick that many Australians thought controversial. Australian fans had
turned out in tens of thousands to watch games on winter nights on big screens in major
cities and television audiences broke records for Association football.
Riding a wave of domestic euphoria, Australia was expected to dominate the Asian
Confederation Championship in 2007. In the event, the Socceroos struggled to get out of
their group and lost on penalty kicks to Japan in the next round, the country it had defeated
in its opening match in Germany. To general surprise and much delight, Iraq came through
to win the title. Australia had not swept all before it, as some feared. It would have to fight
for success over a series of years and matches, which would be of benefit to football in
Australia and to the countries of Asia that would be exposed to a ‘European’ mixture of
physicality and determination. By 2008, Australia had learned not to take the countries of
Asia or the playing conditions lightly and adopted a much more disciplined approach
under a new Dutch coach, Pim Verbeek.
A-League
The haemorrhaging of finance through the NSL was one of the first challenges faced by
the new regime. Over the 2000–01 and 2002–03 seasons the aggregate losses of the NSL
clubs were estimated to have exceeded $52 million. The average attendance at NSL
matches in 2003–04, including finals, was 4446.49 The solution adopted was to bring the
league to an end after season 2003–04 and replace it with a completely new competition,
incorporating franchised clubs in a one-city, one-team model. The initial plan was for a
10-team league with expansion to 12 or more in future, but in the end only eight teams
were deemed acceptable, and even then some failed to meet the financial criteria for entry.
The short-term effect on the careers of players, particularly young players, was seriously
adverse. They missed almost two years of elite-level competition at a critical stage in their
development.
The APFA, founded in 1993, had taken a pro-active role even prior to the Crawford
Report, conducting its own inquiry into the running of the game and influencing theKemeny
Report on the structure of a new national league competition.50 As pointed out above, the
APFA sought to impose cartel discipline on a sport that had lacked that key ingredient of
successful sporting league competition. Cartel discipline requires the clubs taking part to
cooperate or collude to produce a successful sporting and economic outcome.51
Though the moves into Asia and World Cup qualification were critical, the formation
of the A-League as the flagship domestic competition, with a career path for elite
professional players and a broad fan base, was equally important. The model that was
developed aimed at one club per city and one per state, with the exception of New South
Wales, which eventually had three – Sydney FC, Central Coast Mariners based in
Gosford, and Newcastle Jets. The small number of teams allowed concentration of the
available talent to raise standards; there was a return to clear geographic locations rather
than ethnicity as the basis for support; and the short domestic season allowed the leading
teams to take part in international competitions, such as the Asian Champions League and
the World Club Championship. It took time to plan and organize the new league and its
constituent teams so there was no national competition in the summer of 2004–05 and the
new A-League only kicked off in late August 2005.
What made the task of all the new clubs particularly difficult was not just the
competition from the other codes of football, but the recent history of the round-ball game.
Successive administrations, most notoriously that under David Hill, made strenuous
attempts to undermine the ethnic basis of support for many of the successful clubs in the
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previous National League. Making the game ‘mainstream’ was the aim, but the methods
flew in the face of Australia’s professed commitment to multiculturalism and showed a
total lack of awareness of the role of football clubs in helping successive generations of
migrants to this country to become Australian. As the A-League kicked off, Frank Lowy,
as president of the FFA, appealed to the ‘old’ fans to come along to support the new team.
Yet in the end a new demographic has emerged in support of the new teams.52
Deprived of national league football for the best part of two years, following the
Crawford Report into the organization of Association football in Australia, the fans
returned in numbers to support the various state league competitions. In Victoria, the
Premier League attracted more than a quarter of a million people to home and away games
in 2005, before its final series started.53 Individual match attendances varied from several
thousand to a few hundred, so the season average per game of around 2000 is somewhat
misleading. Many of these teams are still strongly based in local ethnic communities, even
though they have given up the previous ethnic identifiers.54 However, the performances
of teams in the various state leagues are no longer the focus of national or state media
coverage. In this respect, the club critics of the national soccer leaguewere correct. The state
competitions would inevitably be devalued by the existence of the NSL or the A-League.
The clubs thus struggle to find the resources to maintain standards of performance, or to
implement strategies to attract supporters in significant numbers from outside the original
community, despite a high level of goodwill among their leaders. Many also feel that
they have been neglected by the FFA whose efforts have been heavily concentrated on
international issues, such as the bid to host the World Cup in 2018 or 2022.
A so far indeterminate number of A-League fans remain attached to these lower level
clubs.55 It has been claimed that that 40% of attendees at A-League games in the first
season had never been to a club soccer match in Australia before.56 Among Melbourne
Victory members, however, only 15% responded that they had not attended a professional
soccer match prior to 2005. More than 25% said they had been regular attenders at the old
National Soccer League.57 As the Crawford Report insisted, there was ‘passionate latent
public support’ for the game in Australia.
That was demonstrated in succeeding years as the new A-League attracted attendances
averaging over 10,000, while Melbourne Victory drew so many fans that it had to move
from the traditional football stadium, Olympic Park, with its 18,000 capacity, to the Telstra
Dome in Docklands, which holds over 55,000. In 2009–10 almost a quarter of all those who
attended A-League matches went to Melbourne Victory home games. In 2007, Victory and
Adelaide United set an Australian club record for an Association football match when they
drew 55,463 to the A-League Grand Final. Since then, the global financial crisis and the
expansion of the league into the Gold Coast and Far North Queensland have contributed to
a decline in the average attendance, though the aggregate has risen. In international
comparison the average crowd size is very respectable (Table 1).58
Table 1. A-League attendances, 2005–2010.
Season Aggregate attendance Games Average attendance inc. finals
2009–10 1,483,790 142 10,449
2008–09 1,166,597 90 12,962
2007–08 1,381,541 90 15,350
2006–07 1,264,603 90 14,051
2005–06 1,084,154 90 12,046
Note: Source: FFA official statistics, 2010.
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Despite good-quality competition, some highly exciting matches, the emergence of
young local talent and the attraction of marquee players from overseas, the best Australian
players are not participating in the A-League. While taking part in top-class competition in
Europe is vital in maintaining the quality of the Socceroos, the A-League is somewhat
devalued as a result. Some key individuals, including Craig Moore, Kevin Muscat, John
Aloisi, Jason Culina, Mile Sterjovski and Daniel Allsopp, have returned to this country to
influence the standard in the A-League and pass on their experience while in the later
stages of their careers. But as Moore has pointed out, the speed of thought and decision
making of the participants in the A-League remains short of that which he was used to in
Scotland and England.
In 2010 the A-League remains precarious, despite exceeding its targets for crowds and
obtaining significant sponsorship. The New Zealand Knights from Auckland, the New
Zealand franchise, folded in 2006. It was tailed off at the bottom of the league for the
second season, had been unable to attract more than an average of 2000 supporters to home
games and remained at loggerheads with the New Zealand football authorities. It was
replaced by Wellington Phoenix whose on-field performances and close links to the
national body give promise of survival. The Wellington club and the FFA overcame
opposition from the Asian Football Confederation, which insisted that the Phoenix must
revert to Oceania at the conclusion of the existing franchise in 2010. The club has a new
five-year licence to participate in the A-League. The Perth club was for a period wholly
owned by the A-League and the FFA had grave difficulty in finding a buyer. Lowy family
interests have substantial investments in Sydney FC and Melbourne Victory. Sydney FC
was sold to a group including Russian billionaire, David Traktovenko, in 2008. Victory did
not meet the FFA financial criteria at the time of its launch. All clubs lost money in their
first season and continue to do so. It is not clear whether any, even Melbourne Victory with
its staggering crowds, is breaking even in the fifth year of the A-League.
In 2009–10 two new teams – Gold Coast United, backed by mining magnate Clive
Palmer, and North Queensland Fury based in Townsville – joined the A-League, with
the latter signing former Liverpool and England striker Robbie Fowler as its marquee
player. Gold Coast attracted Socceroos midfielder, Jason Culina, for its main attraction.
Melbourne Heart will join in 2010–11 and play in the new rectangular stadium, providing
a local derby for the first time in the A-League in Victoria. A second Sydney team is
planned for 2011–12.
Conclusion
Solving ethnic, structural and international issues does not guarantee success and growth
for a code, but without that base the task is very difficult. It is not clear that everything is
sweetness and light for the round ball code in 2010. All three Queensland clubs and
Adelaide United are in ownership limbo, or have been very recently. The franchise and
ownership model, particularly if dependent on a single plutocrat or commercial company,
is very suspect in the era of the global financial crisis. This, of course, is not unique to
Australia, or football, with the Italian Serie A, the English Premier League, the Indian
Premier League cricket competition, and the Australian National Rugby League having
major financial crises – some attributable to levels of debt incurred prior to the global
financial crisis, others to the straitened circumstances of the investors since the crisis, and
some to outright cheating and corruption.59
As Richard Hinds pointed out in a perceptive article, the heavy lifting for the A-League
and the FFA is required in 2010–11 if the code is to capitalize on its recent success.
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The lack of free-to-air television, the modest quality of the domestic game, and the
uncertainties over the finance of clubs all conspire to limit the extent to which the game
can consolidate and expand on its current base.60
Though the game still struggles for full acceptance into Australian sporting culture,
there does seem to be a clear break with the past. Immigration into Australia may be at one
of its periodic peaks, but football is not being driven by a migrant boom for the very first
time in Australian history. It is the domestic population, consisting in part of the offspring
of previous migrant generations, who are the fans and supporters of the game in 2010.61
Many of those who attend games and behave like football supporters around the world are
also keen followers of Australian (Rules) football and rugby league, which have their own
patterns of fan behaviour. Below the elite level, issues remain. Clubs based on ethnic
communities still dominate second-tier competitions. In some regional centres there has
been little organizational change and the game remains fragmented. Attempts to mirror the
patterns of the national structure remain problematic.
Structure alone is not the answer. It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
long-term success. Ethnicity works at times of high, repeated immigration for some groups
but not for all, and not necessarily in a sustainable way for leagues and codes as a whole.
Major shifts in the focus of the game require different approaches, so that what worked
in the past may be an obstacle to development in the present and future. Finally, what
happens overseas has impacts on the domestic game, some positive and some negative,
and fashions change. The future may not be like the past, but a lack of knowledge of that
past inhibits the chances of making sense of the present and hence of the possibilities
inherent in the future. Association football in Australia is guaranteed only one thing.
Interesting times, in the Chinese phrase, lie ahead.
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